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In quick succession the Internet has evolved from a collaborative project among
governments and universities to a promising commercial medium operated primarily by private
ventures. 1 The Internet’s developing third generation appears poised to exploit technological
innovations, expanding broadband access and converging markets 2 with even greater service
diversity and market segmentation. 3 This next generation 4 World Wide Web will not appear as
a standard, “one size fits” all medium primarily because consumers will expect more and
different features. For example, on line game players and Voice over the Internet Protocol
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For background on how the Internet evolved from a government underwritten project to a
privatized and commercialized medium, see Rob Frieden, Revenge of the Bellheads: How the
Netheads Lost Control of the Internet, 26 TELECOM. POL’Y, No. 6, 125-144 (Sep./Oct. 2002);
see also, See, Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard
Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts and Stephen Wolff, A Brief History of
the Internet, Internet Society; available at: http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml.
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For background on the impact of converging telecommunications and information
processing technologies see, e.g., International Telecommunication Union, ITU Internet Report
2006, digital.life; portions available at:
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/publications/digitalife/index.html.
3

See International Telecommunication Union, What Rules for IP-enabled NGNs?,
Workshop, March 23-24, 2006; website available at: http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ngn/eventmarch-2006.phtml.
4

See, e.g., International Telecommunication Union, What Rules for IP-enabled NGN?,
Workshop (March 23-24 2006); web site materials available at:
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ngn/event-march-2006.phtml.
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(“VoIP”) 5 users will require “better than best efforts” 6 routing of bits and presumably will
accept the obligation to pay for less delay, jitter 7 and dropped packets. Already privacy, quality

5

Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) refers to the use of the Internet to carry and
deliver on a real time, immediate basis packets of data that correspond to a voice conversation.
VoIP services range in quality, reliability and price and can link both computers and ordinary
telephone handsets. For technical background on how VoIP works see Intel, White Paper, IP
Telephony Basics, available at:
http://www.intel.com/network/csp/resources/white_papers/4070web.htm; Susan Spradley and
Alan Stoddard, Tutorial on Technical Challenges Associated with the Evolution to VoIP, Power
Point Presentation, available at: http://www.fcc.gov/oet/tutorial/9-22-03_voipfinal_slides_only.ppt. See also, Jerry Ellig and Alastair Walling, Regulatory Status of VoIP in the
Post-Brand X World, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 89 (No. 2006);
Amy L. Leisinger, If It Looks Like a Duck: The Need for Regulatory Parity in VoIP Telephony,
45 WASHBURN L.J. 585 (Spring, 2006); Mark C. Del Bianco, Voices Past: The Present and
Future of VoIP Regulation, 14 COMLCON 365 (2006); R. Alex DuFour, Voice Over Internet
Protocol: Ending Uncertainty and Promoting Innovation Through a Regulatory Framework, 13
COMLCON 471 (2005); Stephen E. Blythe, The Regulation of Voice-Over-Internet-Protocol in
the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L.
161(2005).
6

“The Internet is a vast network of individual computers and computer networks that
communicate with each other using the same communications language, Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). The Internet consists of approximately more than 100
million computers around the world using TCP/IP protocols. Along with the development of
TCP/IP, the open network architecture of the Internet has the following characteristics or
parameters:1. Each distinct network stands on its own with its own specific environment and
user requirements, notwithstanding the use of TCP/IP to connect to other parts of the Internet.
Communications are not directed in a unilateral fashion. Rather, communications are routed
throughout the Internet on a best efforts basis in which some packets of information may go
through one series of computer networks and other packets of information go through a different
permutation or combination of computer networks, with all of these information packets
eventually arriving at their intended destination. 2. Black boxes, for lack of a better term, connect
the various networks; these boxes are called ‘gateways’ and ‘routers.’ The gateways and routers
do not retain information but merely provide access and flow for the packets being transmitted.3.
There is no global control of the Internet.” Konrad L. Trope, Voice Over Internet Protocol: The
Revolution in America’s Telecommunications Infrastructure, 22 COMP. & INTERNET L. 1. No.
12, 1,4 (Dec. 2005).
7

“When you browse the Web, for example, you generate little or no traffic while you're
reading a page, but there is a burst of traffic when your browser needs to fetch a new page from a
server. If a network provider is using minimal delay discrimination, and the high-priority traffic
is bursty, then low-priority traffic will usually sail through the network with little delay, but will
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of service and other factors support partitioning the Internet into Intranets and virtual private
networks. Similarly content providers can use caching 8 and premium traffic routing and
management service to secure more reliable service than that available from best efforts routing.
Clearly service diversification can require many reasonable and lawful types of
discrimination between Internet users notwithstanding a heritage in the first two generations of
nondiscrimination and “best efforts” routing of traffic. Most Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”)
offer access on an unmetered, monthly subscription basis, but some ISPs already offer different
levels of bit delivery speeds. Likewise ISPs increasingly have the ability to examine individual
traffic streams 9 and prioritize them creating a dichotomy between plain vanilla, best efforts
routing and more expensive, superior traffic management services.
However the potential exists for carriers operating the major networks used to switch and
route bitstreams to go beyond satisfying diverse consumer requirements. Advocates for the

experience noticeable delay whenever there is a burst of high-priority traffic. The technical term
for this kind of on-again, off-again delay is ‘jitter.’” Edward W. Felten, Nuts And Bolts Of
Network Neutrality, Practising Law Institute, 24th Annual Institute on Telecommunications
Policy & Regulation, 887 PLI/PAT 317, 326 (Dec. 2006).
8

Caching refers to intermediate and temporary storage of data. “Google makes and
analyzes a copy of each Web page that it finds, and stores the HTML code from those pages in a
temporary repository called a cache.” Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F.Supp.2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006)
(holding that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provides a “safe harbor” exemption
from liability for making cached copies of copyrighted works).
9

“A packet sniffer (also known as a network analyzer or protocol analyzer or, for
particular types of networks, an Ethernet sniffer or wireless sniffer) is computer software or
computer hardware that can intercept and log traffic passing over a digital network or part of a
network. As data streams travel back and forth over the network, the sniffer captures each packet
and eventually decodes and analyzes its content according to the appropriate RFC or other
specifications.” Wikipedia, Packet sniffer; available at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_sniffer.
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principle of network neutrality 10 claim the potential exists for ISPs to engineer a fragmented and
“balkanized” next generation Internet to achieve anticompetitive goals. 11 The worst case
scenario envisioned by network neutrality advocates sees a reduction in innovation, efficiency,
consumer benefits and national productivity occasioned by a divided Internet: one medium prone
to congestion and declining reliability and one offering superior performance and potential
competitive advantages to users able and willing to pay, or affiliated with the ISP operating the

10

For links to a representative sample of advocacy papers and analyses of network
neutrality see National Regulatory Research Institute, Diverse papers on net neutrality; available
at: http://www.nrri.ohio-state.edu/Telecom/hot-topics-links/net-neutrality/papers/.
11

See, e.g., Brett Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Yoo’s Frame and What It Ignores:
Network Neutrality and the Economics of an Information Superhighway, 47 JURIMETRICS J.
(forthcoming 2007); Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network
Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2007); Barbara
A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality to Eliminate Common Carriage Threatens Free
Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 483 (2006); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOM & HIGH TECH L. 141 (2005); available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=388863; Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-toEnd: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 925
(2001).
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bitstream transmission network. 12 Opponents of network neutrality mandates scoff at the
possibility of the worst case scenario, and view government intervention as anathema. 13
This paper will examine the network neutrality debate with an eye toward refuting and
dismissing the many false and misleading claims and concentrating on the real problems
occasioned by the Internet’s third evolution. The paper accepts as necessary and proper many
types of price and quality of service discrimination. However the paper identifies other types of

12

See Jeff Chester, The End of the Internet?, THE NATION (posted Feb. 1, 2006);
available at: www.thenation.com/doc/20060213/chester; Tim Wu, Why You Should Care About
Network Neutrality, The Future of the Internet Depends on it!, Slate (May 1, 2006); available at:
http://www.slate.com/id/2140850/; Trevor R. Roycroft, Economic Analysis and Network
Neutrality: Separating Empirical Facts From Theoretical Fiction (June 2006); available at:
http://www.freepress.net/docs/roycroft_study.pdf; Save the Internet; available at:
http://www.savetheinternet.com/; freepress, Net Freedom Now!; available at:
http://www.freepress.net/deadend/=neutrality; Common Cause, Net Neutrality; available at:
http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=1421497;
Andrew Raff, Net Neutrality Reading List, at IPTA Blog (Feb. 28, 2006); available at:
http://www.iptablog.org/2006/02/28/net_neutrality_reading_list.html.
13

See J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation
of the Internet, 2 J. COMP. L. & ECON. No. 3, 349 (2006); Christopher S. Yoo, Network
Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (June, 2006); Thomas W.
Hazlett, Neutering the net, FINANCIAL TIMES, FT.com Online, posted March 20, 2006;
available at: http://news.ft.com/cms/s/392ad708-b837-11da-bfc5-0000779e2340.html;
Testimony of J. Gregory Sidak, United States Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation (Feb. 7, 2006); available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/sidak-020706.pdf;
U.S. Internet Industry Assn. Network Neutrality: Phantom Problem, Unintended Consequences
(March 14, 2006); available at: http://www.usiia.org/pubs/NNPrimer.doc; Thomas M. Lenard
and, Randolph J. May (Eds.), Net Neutrality or Net Neutering: Should Broadband Internet
Services Be Regulated (2006);
http://www.springer.com/west/home/economics/r+&+d?SGWID=4-40548-22-166923618-0;
Raymond L. Gifford, The Internet Left Gets a Case of the Vapors, The Progress & Freedom
Foundation, Progress Snapshot, Rel. 2.15 (June 2006); available at: http://www.pff.org/issuespubs/ps/2006/ps_2.15_intenet_left.pdf; Adam Thierer, Are ‘Dumb Pipe’ Mandates Smart Public
Policy? Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. Telecomm. &
High Tech. L. 275 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARVARD J. L.
& TECH. (Fall 2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality
Help or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2004).
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hidden and harmful discrimination. The paper concludes with an identification of best practices
in “good” discrimination that should satisfy most network neutrality goals without creating
disincentives that might dissuade ISPs from building the infrastructure needed for Internet 3.0
services.

7
I.

The Provocation: Broadband Access and Upstream Carriers Have to Upgrade Their
Networks Without Certain Profit
Incumbent telephone companies, such as Verizon and AT&T, own and operate ISPs

having the largest market share and operating several of the major long haul networks. 14 Internet
access and long haul data services have become increasingly significant revenue generators in
light of the substantial decline in long distance voice telephony rates and lost market share for
local exchange telephone service. 15 The availability of VoIP services offering flat-rated long
distance on a monthly subscription rate, or per call rates for a few pennies a minute, show how
software applications riding on top of a basic transmission link can devastate an existing business
plan that anticipates the continuation of large profit margins for plain old telephone services.
VoIP and wireless services have adversely impact wireline local exchange revenues as
consumers migrate to a triple play bundle of services from cable television companies offering
local and long distance telephone service and Internet access coupled with their core video
programming services. 16 To retain subscribers the incumbent telephone companies have created

14

Mark Winther, Tier-1 ISPs: What They Are and Why They Are Important, IDC White
Paper (May, 2006); available at: http://www.ntt.net/english/library/pdf/IDCTier1Whitepaper.pdf.
15

See International Telecommunication Union, The Future of Voice: Consumer Issues,
Briefing Paper (Jan. 2007); available at: http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/voice/papers/FoV-EwanSutherland-Final.pdf; see also, International Telecommunication Union, The Future of Voice
Workshop web site; available at: http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/voice/meeting.phtml.
16

“Few doubt that the future of telecommunications will rely mostly on broadband and
wireless technologies. Wireless and broadband technologies are transforming the
telecommunications market, offering users ubiquitous access to voice, data, and internet services.
The number of mobile subscribers has already surpassed that of end-user switched access lines
served by local exchange carriers.” National Regulatory Research Institute, Methods for
Analyzing the Effects of Broadband and Wireless Services on Competition in Local Telephony,
Project Announcement; available at: http://www.nrri.ohio-state.edu/current-
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their own triple play bundles at prices that generate lower margins for the voice telephony
portion of the package deal.
Faced with declining margins, revenues and profits from previously core services,
incumbent telephone companies have belatedly embraced digital technologies and broadband
services that include Internet access and Internet Protocol Television (“IPTV”), a facilities-based
competitive alternative to cable television. 17 The incumbents previously refrained from
aggressively investing in these services for a number of reasons including the view that existing,
“legacy” regulations, which mandated access by competitors to their facilities at below market
rates, 18 created severe disincentives, the necessary technologies and market demand had not

projects/telecommunications/methods-for-analyzing-the-impact-of-broadband-and-wirelessservices-on/.
17

“Rather than ‘broadcasting’ a constant stream of all available programs, as cable does and
Verizon plans to do, IPTV stores a potentially unlimited number of programs on a central server,
which users then call up on demand. SBC will not replace the copper lines that currently run into
customer premises. Instead, to make sure there is sufficient bandwidth between the neighborhood
node where the optical fiber terminates and the household premise, it will upgrade the DSL
equipment currently at those nodes and in households with VDSL technology. At the household,
the viewer will use the IP technology to send a signal to the SBC end-office to send a particular
channel or video on demand selection. That signal will be sent over the same bandwidth used for
data and VoIP service. In SBC's system, a single customer line will have enough bandwidth to
support up to four active television sets per household at a time, or up to two HDTV channels at
a time.” Charles B. Goldfarb, Telecommunications Act: Competition,
Innovation, and Reform, Congressional Research Service 37 (Jan. 13, 2006); available at:
http://www.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/EPO0635.pdf; See also Micah Schwalb, IPTV: Public
Interest Pitfalls, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 305 (Fall, 2006).
18

“For almost ten years, the FCC has struggled with crafting regulations that promote local
exchange carrier competition by requiring incumbent carriers to lease portions of their networks
to competitors.18 Such network element unbundling offers market entrants the opportunity to
provide service and generate competition well before they would have completed construction of
their own facilities.18 Incumbents have successfully argued that instead of jumpstarting
competition, the FCC’s policies made it possible for market entrants to thrive without having to
risk substantial investment in physical plant. The Commission’s rules permit market entrants to
resell existing facilities and services of incumbent carriers on favorable terms and conditions.”

9
matured, a post dotcom meltdown reluctance to assume greater risk 19 and perhaps the failure to
forecast the speed at which core wireline service revenues would decline. Now to make up for
lost time the incumbent telephone companies have embraced fiber optic technology and have
rapidly installed it with the expectation that they can provide a full range of information,
communications and entertainment (“ICE”) services free of pesky, legacy telecommunications
service regulations 20 as well as cable television regulations, including the duty to secure a
separate operating franchise for each municipality served. 21
Incumbents telephone companies have achieved great success in convincing the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) and reviewing courts that competitive necessity and
declining revenues alone would not generate sufficient motivation to invest in next generation
facilities and services. The incumbents succeeded in creating the assumption that substantial

Rob Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery and Information Services Have in Common? Lessons
From Recent Judicial and Regulatory Struggles with Convergence, 32 RUTGERS COMP. &
TECH. L.J., No. 2, 247, 258(2006).
19

See Rob Frieden, Fear and Loathing in Information and Telecommunications Industries:
Reasons for and Solutions to the Current Financial Meltdown and Regulatory Quagmire, 5 THE
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON MEDIA MANAGEMENT, No. 1, 25-38 (Spring, 2003).

20

See Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, 18 FCC Rcd. 16978, 16984 (2003) [hereinafter Triennial Review Order], errata, 18
FCC Rcd. 19020 (2003), vacated in part and remanded sub nom., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC
(USTA II), 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 925 (2004).
21

In a controversial attempt to expedite competitive market entry by wireline telephone
companies into the multi channel video program delivery marketplace the FCC establishes rules
that may be construed as preempting state and municipal franchising authority. Federal
Communications Commission, **order not released
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
FCC Adopts Rules to Ensure Reasonable Franchising Process for New Video Market Entrants,
News Release (Dec. 20, 2006); available at:
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-269111A1.pdf.
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deregulation had to occur, e.g., elimination of the duty to unbundled network access and price
elements at low rates, 22 before the incumbents would consider it fiscally prudent to invest in
broadband access and IPTV. In the space of a few years the incumbents succeeded in
convincing courts and the FCC of the need to dismantle mandatory facilities interconnection and
service pricing requirements contained in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 23 that Congress
had deemed necessary to jump start local exchange competition. 24 Incumbent telephone
companies also succeeded in having the FCC reclassify, 25 or newly classify 26 most Internet-

22

“[P]etitioners argued before the Commission that mandatory unbundling at Commissionmandated prices reduces the incentives for innovation and investment in facilities. Their
reasoning, of course, is that a regulated price below true cost will reduce or eliminate the
incentive for an ILEC to invest in innovation (because it will have to share the rewards with
CLECs), and also for a CLEC to innovate (because it can get the element cheaper as a UNE).
Indeed, many prices that seem to equate to cost have this effect. Some innovations pan out,
others do not. If parties who have not shared the risks are able to come in as equal partners on the
successes, and avoid payment for the losers, the incentive to invest plainly declines.” U.S.
Telecom Assn v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2002) cert. denied sub nom. WorldCom,
Inc. v. United States Telecom Ass'n, 538 U.S. 940 (2003 Mem.). “Each unbundling of an
element imposes costs of its own, spreading the disincentive to invest in innovation and creating
complex issues of managing shared facilities.” Id. 290 F.3d at 427.
23

P.L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, codified at 47 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq.

24

Unbundled Access to Network Elements, 19 FCC Rcd. 16783 (2004); Review of the
Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 19 FCC Rcd. 20293
(2004); Unbundled Access to Network Elements; Review of the Section 251 Unbundling
Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 20 FCC Rcd. 2533 (2005).

25

Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20
FCC Rcd. 14853 (2005)(reclassifying DSL from a telecommunications service to an information
service).
26
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities,
Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband
Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185 & CS Docket No. 02-52,
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd 4798 (2002),
affirmed sub nom. National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet
Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
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based services, including basic access to the Internet, as information services 27 not subject 28 to
traditional, common carrier regulation under Title II 29 of the Communications Act, as
amended. 30

27

Information service is defined as “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring,
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such
capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the
management of a telecommunications service.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(20). “[T]he language and
legislative history of [the Communications Act of 1996] indicate that the drafters . . . regarded
telecommunications services and information services as mutually exclusive categories.”
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11522
(1998); see also Vonage Holdings Corp., 290 F. Supp.2d at 994, 1000 (applying the FCC’s
dichotomy).
28

The FCC retains jurisdiction to regulate information services under Title I of the
Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. §151 et seq. Title I serves as the basis for “ancillary” regulation
of services that have a potentially adverse impact on regulated services.
Additionally Sec. 157 of this Title provides the basis for regulation that “encourage[s] the
provision of new technologies and services to the public.” 47 U.S.C. §157. See also Appropriate
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities; Universal Service
Obligations of Broadband Providers; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC
Broadband Telecommunications Services; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell
Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review -Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Conditional Petition of the
Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) with Regard to
Broadband Services Provided via Fiber to the Premises; Petition of the Verizon Telephone
Companies for Declaratory Ruling or, Alternatively, for Interim Waiver with Regard to
Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the Premises; Consumer Protection in the Broadband
Era, CC Docket Nos. 02-33, 01-337, 95-20, and 98-10 & WC Docket Nos. 04-242 and 05-271,
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 14853, 14855, para. 1
(2005) ( Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order or Consumer Protection in the
Broadband Era Notice), petitions for review pending, Time Warner Telecom v. FCC, No. 054769 (and consolidated cases) (3rd Cir. filed Oct. 26, 2005).
29

30

47 U.S.C. §201 et seq.

Common carriers, including providers of basic telecommunications services, must offer
service on a nondiscriminatory basis, subject to numerous entry regulations, tariffing, and
operating requirements.

12
Having persuaded the FCC that Internet-based services do not constitute
telecommunications services, 31 the incumbent carriers now face a different quandary: the
standard operating procedures under which ISPs interconnect networks 32 prevent incumbent
carriers from directly charging all consumers of their networks despite an ongoing need to invest
more funds in ever increasing bandwidth to meet growing, aggregate demand. ISPs traditionally
establish interconnection terms and conditions based primarily on an assessment of inbound
versus outbound traffic, with additional consideration for such factors as available bandwidth,
number of interconnection locations, diversity of available routes and availability of person-

31

Telecommunications is defined as “the transmission, between or among points specified
by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the
information as sent and received.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(43). Telecommunications service means “the
offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be
effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(46).
The Communications Act defines telecommunications carrier as “any provider of
telecommunications services, except that such term does not include aggregators of
telecommunications services (as defined in section 226). A telecommunications carrier shall be
treated as a common carrier under this Act only to the extent that it is engaged in providing
telecommunications services, except that the Commission shall determine whether the provision
of fixed and mobile satellite service shall be treated as common carriage.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(44).
While information service providers use telecommunications to transmit bitstreams, the
FCC has chosen not to separate this functionality from the information processing that also
occurs. In other words the FCC considers telecommunications to be subordinate to and fully
integrated with the predominant information service.
32

Unlike telecommunications financial settlements, which typically meter and price each
and every network use, ISPs agree not to meter and price traffic they agree to carry based on the
expectation that their “peer” ISP will carry an equivalent volume of traffic. Even for instances
where one ISP pays another for carriage, the “transiting” agreement executed between the two
ISPs specifies the bandwidth and bitstream carriage capabilities offered without typically
metering each session of network usage. For more background on ISP peering and transiting see
Rob Frieden, Network Neutrality or Bias?--Handicapping the Odds for a Tiered and Branded
Internet, __ HASTINGS COM/ENT L.J. ____ (forthcoming, 2007).

13
nel. 33 Telephone companies traditionally establish interconnection terms and conditions that
contemplate metering usage and payment for each and every instance of traffic carriage,
regardless of direction, e.g., from or to end users, or portion of the complete link, e.g., upstream
or downstream. 34
ISPs offer to participate in traffic routing, both upstream to other ISPs and downstream to
end users, based on the expectation that achieving global Internet access will require the
participation of many interconnected ISPs, many of which having no direct, contractual, or

33

For background on the economics and logistics of peering, see Geoff Huston, Where’s
the Money?—Internet Interconnection and Financial Settlements (Jan. 2005); available at:
http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2005-01/; Steve Gibbard, Economics of Peering (Oct. 2004);
available at: http://www.pch.net/resources/papers/Gibbard-peering-economics.pdf; Daniel C.H.
Mah, Explaining Internet Connectivity: Voluntary Interconnection Among Commercial Internet
Service Providers (March 26, 2003); available at:
http://tprc.org/papers/2003/181/Explaining_Internet_Connectivity_Mar26-03.DOC.pdf;
William B. Norton, A Business Case for ISP Peering, Draft 1.3 (Feb. 19 2002); available at:
http://www.equinix.com/pdf/whitepapers/Business_case.pdf; Jean-Jacques Laffont; Scott
Marcus; Patrick Rey; Jean Tirole, Interconnection and Access in Telecom and the Internet, 91
AMER. ECON. REV., No. 2, 287-291 (May, 2001); Bill Woodcock, White Paper on
Transactions and Valuation Associated with Inter-Carrier Routing of Internet Protocol Traffic,
or BGP for Bankers, (Aug. 2000); available at: http://www.pch.net/resources/papers/routingeconomics/pch-routing-economics.htm.
34

For background on the international accounting rate system, see Paul W. Kenefick, A Step
in the Right Direction: The FCC Provides Regulatory Relief in International Settlements and
International Services Licensing, 8 COMLCON 43 (2000); Rob Frieden, MANAGING
INTERNET-DRIVEN CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, ch. 9.1
(2001); Robert M. Frieden, Falling Through the Cracks: International Accounting Rate Reform
at the ITU and WTO, 22 TELECOM POL’Y, 963, 963-75 (1998) (describing how heightened
attention to international calling rates at the ITU and WTO has led some observers to conclude
that carriers soon will impose cost-based termination charges). Rob Frieden, Robert M., Last
Days of the Free Ride? The Consequences of Settlement-Based Interconnection for the Internet,
1 INFO., No. 3, 225-238 (June, 1999).

14
traffic metering relationship. Conceptualizing the Internet as a “network of networks” 35 builds
in an expectation among carriers that they will cooperate on interconnection arrangements.
When carriers first established interconnection agreements they refrained from exact route
mapping and traffic metering. The Transmission Control Protocol used by ISPs determines
routing “on the fly” based on current conditions as opposed to fixed routing used by telephone
companies. 36 The ISPs initially refrained from metering traffic based on the initial expectation
that traffic volumes were roughly equivalent and the cost of metering was not worth the bother in
light of the fact that third parties, such as government agencies, subsidized operations.
Even now the largest Tier-1 ISPs agree to make their networks and global network access
available on a zero cost, sender keep all “peering” 37 basis for other Tier-1 ISPs. 38 Smaller ISPs

35

“The idea of a computer network intended to allow general communication between users
of various computers has developed through a large number of stages. The melting pot of
developments brought together the network of networks that we know as the Internet.”
Wikipedia, History of the Internet; available at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Internet.
36

“TCP/IP routes packets anonymously on a ‘first come, first served’ and ‘best efforts’
basis. Thus, it is poorly suited to applications that are less tolerant of variations in throughput
rates, such as streaming media and VoIP, and is biased against network-based security features
that protect e-commerce and ward off viruses and spam.” Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network
Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (Fall, 2005).
37

Internet peering refers to a reciprocal traffic routing arrangement whereby one ISP agrees
to accept traffic for onward routing in exchange for a similar routing commitment by another
ISP. Peering typically involves no settlement or payment of funds as ISPs agree to peer only if
they generate and receive roughly the same volume of traffic. See also, Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peering.
38

“Tier 1 networks typically seek to protect their relatively rare status by preventing new
networks from becoming Tier 1's and thus potentially competing. The networks often accomplish
this by setting "peering requirements" which are intended to be too high for new networks to
meet. Some experts in the field of Internet interconnections have compared the collective
behaviors and motivations of Tier 1 networks to those of a cartel, in that they attempt to reduce
competition in Internet bandwidth pricing through tacit collusion, and attempt to restrict the
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now must pay for “transiting” 39 access to larger ISPs’ networks and the access these ISPs have
secured to other ISPs’ networks . In addition to transiting payments from smaller ISPs, Tier-1
ISPs, affiliated with incumbent telephone companies, also receive payment from end users that
they serve directly, e.g., through Digital Subscriber Line monthly subscriptions and new fiber
optic residential and business Internet access services.
However, the combined revenues from these two sources have not satisfied top
management officers, for two reasons: 1) proliferating ICE services, such as search engines,
online gaming and real time delivery of video generate ongoing need to upgrade broadband
services, often without a commensurate ability to raise rates; and 2) sources of content upstream
from an incumbent telephone company’s ISP network get to satisfy end user demand and have
content delivered downstream to the end user without having to pay the intermediary ISPs that
have participated in the routing and bitstream delivery of the traffic as part of their transiting and
peering agreements with other ISPs. In the first instance the incumbent companies have found
that Internet access services may have become a commodity business, or at the very least offer
lower margins that anticipated. In the second instance the incumbent companies have identified

admission of new members. When one Tier 1 is perceived to be "cheating" the cartel by selling
transit for too low a price, or by "dumping" too much outbound heavy bandwidth (which is
significantly easier to deliver for the sending network than the receiving network), other
members may move to de-peer that network.” Wikipedia, Tier1 network, Politics; available at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier_1_carrier.
39

Internet transiting refers to a traffic routing arrangement whereby one ISP agrees to
accept traffic for onward routing for compensation. Transiting involves a settlement and
payment of funds because one ISP requires access to the links, subscribers and content available
via another ISP’s network and its peering arrangements. “Transit is the business relationship
whereby one ISP provides (usually sells) access to all destinations in its routing table.” William
B. Norton, Internet Service Providers and Peering, Draft 2.5 (undated)
available at: http://www.equinix.com/pdf/whitepapers/PeeringWP.2.pdf.
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another potential source of access payments that heretofore have avoided having to make direct
payments to some of the carriers participating in the link from content source to recipient.
The apparent inability of ISPs to demand and receive payment from each ISP or ISP
customer has frustrated senior management and motivated them to utter provocative claims that
heavy users of their networks, such as Google, have become free riders:
Now what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them
do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it. So
there’s going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes
to pay for the portion they’re using. Why should they be allowed to use my
pipes? The Internet can’t be free in that sense, because we and the cable
companies have made an investment and for a Google or Yahoo! or Vonage or
anybody to expect to use these pipes [for] free is nuts! 40
A.

Incumbents Perceive Network Neutrality as Foreclosing Pricing Realignments and
Reimposing Aspects of Telecommunications Common Carrier Regulation
Incumbent carriers and like minded opponents to network neutrality have characterized

their opposition to network neutrality in terms of standing firm against government intrusion, 41
the imposition of a remedy in search of a problem 42 and the need to remedy free ridership of ISP

40

At SBC, It’s All About “Scale and Scope,” BUSINESSWEEK, ONLINE EXTRA
November 7, 2005.
41

See, e.g., Hands Off the Internet, World Wide Web Site; available at:
http://handsoff.org/blog/. “Hands Off The Internet is a nationwide coalition of Internet users
united together in the belief that the Net's phenomenal growth over the past decade stems from
the ability of entrepreneurs to expand consumer choices and opportunities without worrying
about government regulation.” http://handsoff.org/hoti_docs/aboutus/.
42

“Currently there are no principles of network neutrality encoded into law. So ISPs are
already free to block or favor content as they please. It’s telling that none of them has. In fact, no
proponent of network neutrality can cite an existing problem to which network neutrality is a
solution.” Arpan Sura, The Problem With Network Neutrality, FreedomWorks World Wide Web
Site, (May 2, 2006); available at:
http://www.freedomworks.org/informed/issues_template.php?issue_id=2571; Other web-based
organizations hotly dispute this view: “The constant refrain of the Astroturf groups like
McCurry’s ‘Hands Off the Internet’ is that Network Neutrality is a solution in search of a
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networks. 43 Outside the headlines and Congressional committee hearing rooms 44 these carriers
object to network neutrality on two more practical concerns: 1) it would foreclose pricing and
service initiatives that if successful might contribute to the bottom line; and 2) it would resurrect
some of the regulatory constraints the carriers thought they had avoided once and for all having
won the right to recharacterize most of their infrastructure as providing largely unregulated
information services.
1)

Network Neutrality as a Constraint on Price Discrimination

Network neutrality, whether imposed by law or public interest based FCC regulation, can
impose direct restrictions on ISP pricing, but not in the grave and broadly restrictive manner as

problem. They cite the absence of numerous examples of blocking or degradation to back this
argument. This is a red herring. There are multiple real-world instances of blocking and
impairment.” Save the Internet.com, Big Lie of the Week: No. 3, undated; available at:
http://www.savetheinternet.com/=lie3.
43

“The network builders are spending a fortune constructing and maintaining the networks
that Google intends to ride on with nothing but cheap servers,” Arshad Mohammed, Verizon
Executive Calls for End to Google’s ‘Free Lunch,’ Washington Post, D1 (February 7, 2006);
available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/06/AR2006020601624.html.
44

See, e.g., United States Senate, Committee on Science, Commerce and Transportation,
Net Neutrality, Full Committee Hearing, (Feb. 7 2006); available at:
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/witnesslist.cfm?id=1705; United States Hourse of
Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and the Internet, Hearings on H.R. ____, Committee Print on the Communications Opportunity,
Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006 (March 30, 2006); available at:
http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/Hearings/03302006hearing1823/hearing.htm.
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articulated by incumbent carriers. Not all network neutrality advocates object to “access
tiering” 45 that constitutes price and quality of service discrimination on the end user, demand
side. ISPs already offer end users different subscription rates based of bandwidth and bitrates.
Additional differentiation could involve variable service quality, based on the ability to handle
peak demand bursts as occurs in peer-to-peer networking, video gaming, delivery of large files
and real time streaming of video programming.
Similarly the concept of network neutrality does not foreclose attempts by incumbent
carriers to reshape access pricing into a conventional two-sided market where ISPs would
demand and receive payments downstream and upstream regardless whether they serve end
users. Under the current pricing arrangement a two sided market 46 already exists for ISPs that
can collect an Internet access subscription from end users for DSL and cable modem access to
the Internet cloud 47 and also charge transit fees for small ISPs seeking access to portions of the
Internet cloud these small ISPs cannot reach via their own networks.
Ed Whitacre has objected to the one sided market scenario where AT&T receives
subscription payments from end users, but no additional payments from content generators who

45

Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation,
109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Prof. Lawrence Lessig) [hereinafter Lessig Testimony],
available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/lessig-020706.pdf.
46

“Two-sided (or more generally multi-sided1) markets are roughly defined
as markets in which one or several platforms enable interactions between end-users, and
try to get the two (or multiple) sides “on board” by appropriately charging each side.
That is, platforms court each side while attempting to make, or at least not lose, money
overall.” Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: An Overview
(March 12, 2004); available at: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/rochet_tirole.pdf.
47

The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make up the
Internet and provider users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the content
available via these networks.
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“use” AT&T networks without making direct payments to AT&T. Nothing about network
neutrality forecloses AT&T from erecting a service so attractive to Google and other heavy users
of the Internet as to entice them to opt for premium carriage of their traffic in lieu of the shared
routes made available through the peering and transit arrangements secured by the ISPs directly
serving these heavy users. For example, Akamai and other network management firms offer
clients enhanced Internet traffic routing and content delivery by offloading traffic from best
efforts routing options and onto better than best efforts options. Traffic can reach consumers
with greater likelihood of on time delivery and reliability when ISPs and other Internet
companies directly manage particular traffic streams with an eye toward reducing the number of
routers the traffic has to traverse, avoiding circuitous routing and inserting traffic on the most
reliable and least congested networks.
Many universities, along with corporations, government research agencies, and not-forprofit networking organizations, have agreed to achieve this type of outcome by underwriting
superior routing through the Internet-2 network, 48 a series of broadband links not regularly
available to non investors. Internet-2 has links to and from the plain vanilla Internet, but
investors have enhanced the likelihood of reliable and qualitative superior routing by creating a
direct or near direct links among investing organizations. The corporate equivalent to this better
than best efforts complete link from content source to consumer are virtual private networks and
Intranets that carve out a small portion of the overall infrastructure used to provide Internet
telecommunications.

48

See Internet2 Network, World Wide Web site; available at:
http://www.internet2.edu/network/.
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Nothing would foreclose AT&T and other incumbent carriers from engineering a
superior and complete Internet routing arrangement using the carrier’s own facilities, or those of
other carriers with which AT&T negotiated a special traffic management and routing
agreement. 49 Network neutrality only would foreclose AT&T from punishing Internet users who
have declined the managed service option with less than best efforts routing, i.e., deliberately
dropping packets, creating artificial network congestion, violating Service Level
Agreements 50 and otherwise deteriorating the quality of service provided by network links that
AT&T has agreed to make available to other peers and transit customers, including the ISPs
directly serving heavy content providers such as Google.
2)

Reimposition of Common Carrier Responsibilities

The incumbent carriers make a valid point that elements of network neutrality impose
common carrier regulatory burdens on ISPs that have avoided such burdens, or have been able to
secure a reclassification of services to avoid such responsibilities. Having avoided this
classification the incumbent carriers imply that common carrier regulation imposes costly
burdens that limit flexibility, stifle innovation and subverts the opportunity for self-regulation via
unfettered marketplace forces. Opponents to network neutrality also consider enforcement of the
antitrust law a sufficient safeguard that could punish abuses after the fact without the cost and
burdens of ex ante regulation.

49

See Craig McTaggart, Was The Internet Ever Neutral?, paper presented at the 34th
Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy, George Mason
University School of Law, Arlington, Virginia (rev. Sep. 30, 2006); available at:
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2006/593/mctaggart-tprc06rev.pdf.
50

Service Level Agreements specify network performance commitments typically between
ISPs and their customers.
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While common carrier regulation imposes some degree of constraints that would not
otherwise exist, one should examine closely the nature of common carrier restrictions that
network neutrality would impose. Not all common carriers face the same level of constraints,
and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides a method for selective elimination of
common carrier burdens when the public interest supports such a reduction. 51 Technically
cellular telephone companies still operate under some of the constraints of common carrier
regulation, 52 but one could hardly say such regulation imposes any significant constraint on
pricing and operational flexibility. Indeed cellular carriers have avoided most common carrier
restrictions including limitations on erecting “walled garden,” preferred access to video and
Internet-based content accessible on the screens of handsets used by subscribers.
In other proceedings the FCC has shown that it can and will impose quasi-common
carrier responsibilities on non common carriers if the public interest warrants, or Congress
requires it. The FCC has required non common carrier, cable and satellite television companies
to carry broadcast television signals as a form of economic and public interest regulation
designed to safeguard the continuing viability of broadcast television stations. 53 Recently the

51

Communications Act of 1934, as amended, Sec. 10(c), codified at 47 U.S.C. §160(c).

52

Personal Communications Industry Association's Broadband Personal Communications
Services Alliance's Petition for Forbearance For Broadband Personal Communications Services,
WT Docket No. 98-100, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
13 FCC Rcd 16857 (1998); In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Second Report and Order, 9
FCC Rcd. 1411, 1478 (1994). Orloff v. FCC, 352 F.3d 415, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that
although the Commission found that the competitiveness of the commercial mobile radio service
market justified exempting such carriers from the tariffing requirements of section 203 of the
Act, the Commission has nonetheless declined to exempt them from Sections 201 or 202).
53

See Communications Act of 1934, as amended (“Communications Act”), 47 U.S.C. §§
325, 338-40, 534-35, 543, 548; 47 C.F.R § 76.55-62 (cable must carry); 47 C.F.R. § 76.64 (cable
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FCC has required, non common carrier VoIP service providers to contribute to universal service
funding, 54 to support enhanced 911 emergency access 55 and to cooperate with law enforcement
officials 56 in much the same way as common carrier regulated telephone companies.
3)

Network Neutrality Requirements as Confiscatory and a Taking of Property

Opponents to network neutrality also imply that network neutrality requirements
constitute a “confiscatory” and unlawful “taking” of their property. 57 Having invested in next
generation infrastructure at significant expense both incumbent telephone and cable television
operators expect to have nearly complete freedom from telecommunications service regulation.

retransmission consent); 47 C.F.R. § 76.66 (DBS signal carriage). Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (Turner-I); Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II).
54

Universal Service Contribution Methodology, WC Docket No. 06-122, Report and Order
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 06-94, 38 Communications Reg. (P&F) 1013, 2006
WL 1765838 (F.C.C.)(rel. June 27, 2006).
55

IP-Enabled Services, WC Docket No. 04-36, E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service
Providers, WC Docket No. 05-196, First Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
20 FCC Rcd. 10245 (2005). The FCC declined to determine the statutory classification of
interconnected VoIP services, but asserted ancillary jurisdiction under Title I of the Act to
require interconnected VoIP service providers to supply 911 emergency calling capabilities to
their customers.
56

Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and
Services, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,989 (2005), on partial reconsideration, 21 FCC Rcd. 5008 (2006).

57

While reviewing courts have questioned the nature, type and rates of the FCC mandated
common carrier interconnection and facilities-leasing requirements, the judiciary has not deemed
the requirements confiscatory: “There is no evidence that the decision to adopt TELRIC [i.e.,
compulsory pricing of local exchange service elements on the basis of quite low Total Element
Long Run Incremental Cost] was arbitrary, opportunistic, or undertaken with a confiscatory
purpose. Indeed, the indications in the record are very much to the contrary.” Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 535 U.S. 467, 472, 122 S.Ct. 1646, 1652 (2002). F.C.C. v.
Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 107 S.Ct. 1107 (1987) (rate set by the FCC was not
confiscatory and thus did not amount to an unconstitutional taking).
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However next generation networks will offer a integrated blend of ICE services, including the
functional equivalent of traditionally regulated, legacy voice telephony and cable television.
The incumbent carriers appear ready to make two key arguments that equate regulation
going forward as confiscatory: 1) robust facilities-based competition obviates the need for
regulation, including common carrier aspects of network neutrality; and 2) commingling and
integrating services that use telecommunications for bitstream transmission converts all retail
offerings into information services. The incumbents have convinced many legislators and
regulators that network neutrality requirements do not make sense in a competitive environment
where the Internet serves as single medium for convergent ICE services.
a)

The True Current State of Broadband Competition

Incumbent carriers, through direct advocacy and advocacy by sponsored researchers,
confidently assert that robust competition already exists both inside the Internet cloud and at the
first and last mile broadband link from residences and businesses to ISPs. For its part the FCC
has generated glowing endorsements of this assumption based on statistical compilations, 58 no
doubt influenced by its appreciation for the political and public relations dividends in compiling
positive results. On the other hand other less partisan calculations show the U.S. significantly
behind trailing even other nations, in terms of overall market penetration, competitiveness and
cost, even as compared to nations that have unfavorable geographical and demographic

58

Federal Communications Commission, Industry Analysis and Technology Division
Wireline Competition Bureau, High-Speed Services for Internet Access: Status as of June 30,
2006 (Jan. 2007); available at: http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC270128A1.doc.

24
characteristics. 59
The FCC has deliberately overstated broadband penetration progress by using an overly
generous and unrealistic definition of what qualifies as broadband service 60 and by using zip
codes as the primary geographic unit of measure. 61 Additionally the FCC includes as competition
services lacking any true cross-elasticity with other services based on substantial price
differences. More credible calculations by the International Telecommunication Union and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development show the U.S. well behind many

59

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop reports that the United States
ranked 12th in broadband penetration as of June 2006. OECD Broadband Statistics to June 2006
available at:
http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,2340,en_2649_34225_37529673_1_1_1_1,00.html#Data200
5;
The International Telecommunication Union ranked the United States 15th in the world in
terms of broadband penetration per 100 inhabitants as of 1 January 2006. International
Telecommunication Union, Strategy and Policy Unit Newslog - ITU Broadband Statistics for 1
January 2006; available at:
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/newslog/CategoryView,category,Broadband.aspx; The ITU’s broader
benchmarking of the most important indicators for measuring a nation’s capability to promote
information and communications technologies and the “Information Society” ranked the United
States 21st in the world. International Telecommunication Union, Digital Opportunity Index
(using 2005 statistics); available at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/statistics/DOI/index.phtml.
60

“We use the term ‘high-speed’ to describe services that provide the subscriber with
transmissions at a speed in excess of 200 kilobits per second (kbps) in at least one direction.
‘Advanced services,’ which provide the subscriber with transmission speeds in excess of 200
kbps in each direction, are a subset of high-speed services.” Federal Communications
Commission, High-Speed Services for Internet Access: Status as of June 30, 2006, 1, n.
1[hereinaftrer cited as FCC High Speed Internet Access Statistics].
61

“The Commission’s data collection program requires providers to list the Zip Codes in
which the provider has at least one high-speed connection in service to an end user . . ..” HighSpeed Services for Internet Access: Status as of June 30, 2006 at 3. “No consideration is given to
the price, speed or availability of connections across the ZIP code.” S. Derek Turner, Broadband
Reality Check-The FCC Ignores America’s Digital Divide (2005); available at:
http://www.freepress.net/docs/broadband_report.pdf.
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nations both in terms of broadband market penetration, e.g., subscribers per one hundred
inhabitants and expense, e.g., cost per kilobit. 62
A fair minded assessment of broadband competition in the United States shows a mixed
bag. It appears that ISP competition inside the Internet cloud remains robust. Instances where
one ISP has threatened to “de-peer” 63 with another have not resulted in long term service
outages, 64 nor have any smaller ISPs declared an inability to cobble together all the transiting
agreements needed to access the entire Internet cloud.
However, the state of competition for first and last mile access to competing ISPs is far
less robust. Even the FCC’s own statistics acknowledges that incumbent telephone and cable

62

“The price of bandwidth in September 2005 varies greatly across the OECD with prices
ranging from USD 0.29 (PPP) per Mbit/s in Japan to over USD 150 (PPP) from several operators
in the OECD. provides Mbit/s pricing for the 15 lowest-price providers for each technology. It
seems that the level of competition in the market is a much stronger determinant of price than the
underlying technology. Japanese, French and Korean broadband connections are the least
expensive per Mbit/s for cable, ADSL and fibre.” Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Committee for Information,
Computer and Communications Policy, Working Party on Telecommunication and Information
Services Policies, Multiple Play: Pricing and Policy Trends, DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2005)12/FINAL
24 (April 7, 2006); see Figure 8. Broadband prices per Mbit/s, top 15 firms, by technology,
September 2005, USD/PPP; id. at 24.
“[ISPs in] South Korea and Japan . . . routinely offer 100 Mbps connections in both
directions, uploading and downloading, for around $40 per month. But in the United States, the
best connections top out at 1/3 this speed and cost 400% more—and very few places even have
access to the new fiber-optic services being offered.” Bruce Kushnick, Where’s that broadband
fiber-optic access? Nieman Watch Dog, Ask This (March 14, 2006); available at:
http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask_this.view&askthisid=186.
63

De-peering refers to the discontinuation of a zero cost interconnection agreement
typically based on the determination that traffic flows are not symmetrical.

64

See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Level 3, Cogent resolve peering spat, renew deal, NETWORK
WORLD (Oct. 28, 2005 ); available at: http://www.networkworld.com/edge/news/2005/102805cogent-level3.html.
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television companies provide the vast majority of all broadband services. 65 But rather than
acknowledge that a duopoly exists in most parts of the United States, the FCC pads the number
of available broadband services providers in a manner that promotes the inference that
widespread and robust competition exists based on the promise of new technologies, such as
broadband over power lines 66 and Wi-Max, 67 the existence of at least one subscriber throughout
the geographical area represented by a zip code and the availability of satellite and terrestrial
wireless options, albeit at prices significantly higher than wireline cable and DSL options. The
Commission uses an unrealistically low bitrate of 200 kilobits to define broadband service. It

65

“Of the 64.6 million total high-speed lines, 44.1% were cable modem, 34.9% were
ADSL, 1.5% were symmetric DSL (SDSL) or traditional wireline, 1.1% were fiber to the end
user premises, and 18.4% used other technologies.” FCC High Speed Internet Access Statistics at
2. “Of the 50.4 million lines which were faster than 200 kbps in both directions, 55.9% were
cable modem, 36.3% were ADSL, 1.9% were SDSL or traditional wireline, 1.4% were fiber
to the end user premises, and 4.5% used other technologies.” Id. at 3. Of the 45.9 million lines
serving residential subscribers, “cable modem represented 59.9% while 35.8% were ADSL,
0.2% were SDSL or traditional wireline, 1.0% were fiber to the end user premises, and 3.2%
used other technologies.” Id. at 3.
66

“[W]e find that resolving the narrow classification issues of BPL-enabled Internet access
service immediately will promote the deployment of BPL technology and the proliferation of this
nascent service. Perhaps more importantly, we find that saddling this service with conditions that
do not apply to other competing forms of broadband Internet access services would create a
regulatory disparity antithetical to our creation of a level playing field for all modes of this
service.” United Power Line Councils Petition For Declaratory Ruling Regarding the
Classification of Broadband Over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information Service,
WC 06-10, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 06-165, 2006 WL 3207080 (F.C.C.) (rel.
Nov. 7, 2006)(deeming BPL an information service and a competitive alternative to other
wireline Internet access technologies).
67

“WiMAX (World Interoperability for Microwave Access, Inc.) is a wireless broadband
technology based on the IEEE 802.16 standard, which supports delivery of last mile wireless
broadband access as an alternative to cable and DSL. WiMAX can support fixed and nomadic, as
well as portable and mobile wireless broadband applications without the need for direct line-ofsight with a base station.” Consolidated Request of the WCS Coalition for Limited Waiver of
Construction Deadline for 132 WCS Licenses, WT 06-102, DA 06-2461, Order 2006 WL
3491617 (F.C.C), n.56 (rel Dec. 1, 2006); (citing WiMAX Forum White Paper, Third Plugfest -Sophia Antipolis at 4 (Mar. 2006).
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makes no distinction between a facilities-based operator and one that resells the services of the
two primary facilities-based carriers. The Commission includes operators whose services might
be available within a portion of a wide geographical area defined by zip codes. Additionally the
Commission includes broadband services, such as that offered by satellite and terrestrial wireless
operators, that offer comparatively slower services as far higher prices thereby making these
options unlikely competitors with limited attractiveness for users in fixed location having
cheaper options available, e.g., DSL and cable modem service.
b)

The Information Service Classification “Safe Harbor”

The incumbent telephone companies led the successful campaign to have the FCC deem
as information services the broadband first and last mile links to the Internet cloud, viz. DSL and
cable modem access. Having classified Internet access as an information service, the FCC will
have to resort to clever and probably unsustainable semantic maneuvering to classify as a
telecommunications service any software application, riding on top 68 of the information service

68

The FCC uses telecommunications service and information service definitions to
establish regulatory classifications, without considering the several layers of functionality
involved. For example companies supplying software, which can be installed for use when
initiating an Internet session, properly avoid FCC regulation. Likewise the FCC can avoid
having to regulate the protocols and standards establishing standard operating procedures for
switching, routing and managing Internet traffic. See, e.g., United States Senate, Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, Prepared Statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President
and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google, Inc. available at:
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1705&wit_id=4958.
“The Internet’s open, neutral architecture has proven to be an enormous engine for market
innovation, economic growth, social discourse , and the free flow of ideas. The remarkable
success of the Internet can be traced to a few simple network principles—end-to-end design,
layered architecture, and open standards—which together give consumers choice and control
over their online activities.”
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classified bitstream transmission functionality. 69 If this scenario plays out the FCC would have to
extend its information service classification to other services made available to end users on a
retail basis via information service classified DSL and cable modem links, including VoIP and
IPTV. These services compete with and constitute the functional equivalent of legacy services
heretofore subject to regulation, common carriage telecommunications service regulation for
voice telephony and cable television regulation. If the information service classification extends
vertically up to software applications, then the FCC will have created a deregulated safe harbor

69

While the FCC also exempts bitstream transmitting carriers from regulation, in light of
the information service classification, the Commission could opt to examine separately the
different layers combined to support the delivery of a service, such as VoIP. For background on
a revised regulatory regime that applies different degrees of government oversight based on the
scope of competition in each layer of service that blends telecommunications packet delivery
with intelligent networking , software applications and content see Richard S. Whitt, A
Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating A New Communications Public Policy Framework
Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587 (May, 2004); Yochai Benkler,
From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable
Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561 (2000); Scott Marcus, The Potential
Relevance to the United States of the European Union’s Newly Adopted Regulatory Framework
for Telecommunications, Federal Communications Commission, Office of Plans and Policy
Working Paper Series No. 36 (July, 2002); available at: http://www.fcc.gov/osp/workingp.html;
Douglas Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy (2002);
unpublished paper available at:
http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2002/95/LayeredTelecomPolicy.pdf; Kevin Werbach, A
Layers Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L., 37 (2002); John T.
Nakahata, Regulating Information Platforms: The Challenge of Rewriting Regulation From the
Bottom Up, 1 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L., 95 (2002); Phillip J. Weiser, Law and
Information Platforms, J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L., 1 (2002); Craig McTaggert, A
Layered Approach to Internet Legal Analysis (Dec. 21, 2002); available at
http://www.innovationlaw.org/cm/ilg2002/reading/layered1.pdf; Robert Cannon, The Legacy of
the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167
(2003); Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation:
A Comparison of the Traditional and a New Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 207
(2003).
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for just about any ICE service carried via DSL and cable modem links, regardless of its
functional equivalency with legacy, regulated services.
The FCC already has begun to realize the quandary it has created for itself by fashioning
such an elastic and expanding safe harbor. Now bereft of Title II jurisdiction, the Commission
has resorted to Title I of the Communications Act, as amended, to retain an “ancillary”
regulatory hook if and when necessary. The Commission already has applied this exception to
the information service regulatory safe harbor by requiring VoIP service providers to contribute
to universal telephone service funding, to make available emergency 911 access available and to
cooperate with law enforcement officials. The Commission has rationalized its imposition of
quasi-common carrier, telecommunications service regulation by invoking broad notions of the
public interest, by making a distinction between how different laws define telecommunications 70 and by making a questionable differentiation between the use of telecommunications to
transport bits corresponding to an information service and the use of telecommunications to
transport bits corresponding to retail telecommunications services. 71
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Section 102(8)(B)(ii) of the Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act, PL
103-414, 108 Stat 4279 (October 25, 1994), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(B)(ii) defines a
“telecommunications carrier” as “a person or entity engaged in providing wire or electronic
communication switching or transmission service to the extent that the Commission finds that
such service is a replacement for a substantial portion of the local telephone exchange service
and that it is in the public interest to deem such a person or entity to be a telecommunications
carrier for purposes of this title.” The FCC has interpreted this section as requiring the
Commission “to deem certain service providers to be telecommunications carriers for CALEA
purposes even when those providers are not telecommunications carriers under the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended.” Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act and Broadband Access and Services, ET Docket No. 04-295, First Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14989, 14993 (2005).
71

See Rob Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery and Information Services Have in Common?
Lessons From Recent Judicial and Regulatory Struggles with Convergence, 32 RUTGERS
COMPUTER AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL, No. 2, 247-296 (2006).
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The FCC may yet again face close judicial scrutiny and reversal for creating a regulatory
safe harbor only to chip away at it. First, the Commission may overly stretch its general public
interest mandate under Title I of the Communications Act. Second, the Commission may not
persuade reviewing courts that ancillary jurisdiction, under Title I, as opposed to conventional
telecommunications service jurisdiction, under Title II, should apply to VoIP, particularly in
light of the Commission’s selective imposition of telephone company regulations on VoIP
service providers. Third, the Commission’s telecommunications versus telecommunications
service distinction, may not pass muster with reviewing courts in light of the fact that
telecommunications bitstream delivery occurs in the very same way for both telecommunications
services and information services. 72
B.

Calibrating Carrier Rights and Responsibilities
Common carriers historically incur both responsibilities and special opportunities, e.g.,

rights of way access to federal, state, municipal and private property for little if any payment. 73
So too have the telephone and cable television companies that now complain that regulation
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In National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 125
S. Ct. 2688 (2005) the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC’s regulatory distinction between
telecommunications and telecommunications services primarily on procedural grounds that favor
judicial deference to expert regulatory agency decision making articulated by the Court in
Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778
(1984). See also Rob Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery and Information Services Have in
Common? Lessons From Recent Judicial and Regulatory Struggles with Convergence, 32
RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J., No. 2, 247, 258(2006).
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For example, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as amended, specified the right of
wireless telecommunications service providers to secure rights of way and tower siting access to
federally owned property. Telecommunications Act of 1996, P.L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996),
Sec. 734(c) (2006), codified at 47 U.S.C. §332(c)(7). Generally a telecommunications service
provider can secure nondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way
owned or controlled by another telecommunications service provider. 47 U.S.C. §224.
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confiscates their property. It comes across as disingenuous for both telephone and cable
television companies to rationalize the right to extend legacy privileges, acquired during their
regulated years, to convergent ICE services, many or all of which appear to qualify for the
information service safe harbor.
Currently cable television operators and telephone companies can leverage preexisting
rights or way or secure new rights of way based on their former, or existing, but possibly now
temporary, regulated status. There appears to be no distinction in terms of the scope of rights of
way access available to carriers operating in their legacy, regulated mode and the very same
carriers providing a larger array of services, some or all of which falling outside legacy
regulators’ jurisdiction. 74 For example, cable television operators regularly install equipment,
including large above ground pedestals, without any payment to the property owner, so that the
operators can offer triple play services regardless of whether the land owner wants these new
services and without regard to the limited scope of services the carrier first offered as the basis
for securing the rights of way initially. Similarly telephone companies continue to install new or
replacement lines on private property without having to pay land owners, based on preexisting
rights of way granted to the companies in their capacity telecommunications service providers.
For so long as incumbent carriers continue to exploit the privileges conferred upon them
in their capacity as regulated operators, these carriers should continue to accept limited quasicommon carrier responsibilities. For example, the broadcast television channel “must carry”
obligations of cable television operators do not evaporate simply because telephone companies
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The Supreme Court has endorsed this leveraging of access rights. In National Cable &
Telecommunications Association, Inc., v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 122 S.Ct. 782 (2002)
the Supreme ruled that cable television companies have the same legal right to access and attach
wires to poles owned and operated by other utilities regardless of which such pole attachments
are used to provide regulated video or unregulated broadband services.
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may offer competing video program delivery services, or that cable television operators now can
use existing copper, a blend of copper and fiber optics cables, or a completely fiber optic
medium to provide both cable television video programming, IPTV, telephony, Internet access
and other telecommunications or information services. Likewise, the responsibilities applied to
incumbent telephone companies operating the only telecommunication wire into homes did not
evaporate simply because a second wire became available, or the fact that the telephone
company now can use existing or new media to provide telecommunications and information
services.
II.

The Response: Established Ground Rules Plus Enforcement
Network neutrality advocates have both well placed apprehension and a misguided sense

of what ISPs owe the public and their customers. ISPs do not operate in a transparent and fully
competitive marketplace in light of nondisclosure agreements that shield interconnection
agreements from scrutiny and still limited broadband competition at enduser premises. Absent
transparency and competition, network neutrality advocates have every reason to suspect large
ISPs of leveraging their Tier-1 status to favor affiliates and preferred content suppliers, to punish
unaffiliated content suppliers that have rejected premium service and to block, degrade or
generate artificial congestion for non-premium routing services. Users of ISP bitstream
transmission and routing services cannot readily determine whether any particular ISP has acted
on its incentives to tilt the competitive playing field and to play favorites, primarily because any
complete end-to-end routing involves several ISPs and delays for any particular segment may
result from a number of legitimate factors.
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A.

Justified Apprehension

Network neutrality advocates primarily have only anecdotal information of intentional
efforts to delay, block and drop packets. 75 The FCC has intervened in only one instance
involving a telephone company’s refusal to terminate VoIP traffic. 76 The Commission secured
an agreement by Madison River Communications to resume the proper delivery of such traffic,
in light of the company’s status as a telecommunications service provider legally obligated to
perform traditional common carrier duties. Had Madison River Communications operated as an
ISP providing Internet access, the FCC might not have responded in a timely manner, if at all,
based on the view that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to compel ISPs to interconnect with
anyone.
ISPs’ incentive and apparent desire to differentiate service, the costly and widespread
opposition to network neutrality and the provocative assertions of incumbent carrier senior
managers point to a keen interest in pursuing network tiering. The often cited Madison River
case may offer little evidence that Internet content and service providers regularly risk unfair
price and quality of service discrimination, or worst yet absolute blockage. However it does
support apprehension that an enforcement mechanism does not exist when an ISP and not a
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See, e.g., SavetheInternet.com, How does this threat to Internet freedom affect you?
available at: http://www.savetheinternet.com/=threat (claiming blocked access by Canadian
incumbent telephone company to a Web site sympathetic to the Telecommunications Workers
Union during a contentious labor dispute; intentional degradation of competing VoIP service
by Shaw, a major Canadian cable, internet, and telephone service company and blocked emails
that mentioned www.dearaol.com -- an advocacy campaign opposing an attempt by AOLTime Warner’s to secure payment from e-mail senders).
76

Madison River Communications, LLC, Order, DA 05-543, 20 FCC Rcd 4295 (2005),
available at: http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-05-543A1.pdf.
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telephone company common carrier engages in unreasonable discrimination, or absolute
blockage. The FCC could threaten an investigation with the prospect of enforcement sanction
only because the offending traffic blocker had an affirmative duty to accept traffic and deliver it
to the final destination.
ISPs as non common carriers, not subject to Title II of the Communications Act have no
absolute obligation to accept and deliver VoIP traffic. Indeed ISPs have every incentive to favor
their own VoIP service, or to block any VoIP traffic to enhance the likelihood that telephony
traffic will trigger higher termination charges as has traditionally been the case when local
exchange carriers originate and terminate voice traffic. 77 In other words an ISP receiving VoIP
traffic has every incentive to act in the very same manner as the Madison River telephone
company. Should an ISP block VoIP traffic the FCC would not have Title II as an ironclad legal
basis for mandating interconnection. Instead the FCC could defer to an ISP’s decision whether
to accept VoIP traffic, or the Commission might invoke its general Title I jurisdiction to mandate
interconnection on public interest grounds.
Until such time as the first and last mile of broadband access becomes robustly
competitive customers will have as few as one or two carriers available for broadband access to
the Internet and VoIP service providers. Under these conditions a decision by DSL and cable
modem service providers to block VoIP traffic, or to degrade the traffic of unaffiliated or nonpreferred VoIP service providers would have an immediate, identifiable and adverse impact on
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The charges imposed by local exchange carriers for use of their networks to originate and
terminate traffic depend on the nature of the service regardless of whether different services
impose different costs. For example, local exchange carriers typically charge more to terminate
a wireless, cellular telephone call than a conventional, wireline telephone call even though the
costs of doing so are identical. Traffic characterized as voice telephony also triggers carrier
liability for contributing to universal service funding.
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the public interest. Under such circumstances the FCC should act, because the failure to do so
would frustrate the Commission legislative mandate to promote ubiquitous access to “advanced
telecommunications capability.” 78 Additionally the failure to act probably would motivate some
state regulatory agencies to intervene with possibly divergent remedies. More broadly the
Commission would face clear evidence of market failure, bottleneck abuse and price squeezing
behavior that it presumed could not occur in the competitive marketplace it assumed to exist.
The VoIP market will have displayed market failure characteristics if VoIP service
providers cannot readily offer services to any DSL and cable modem subscriber, and deliver
traffic to any telephone service subscriber whether connected via DSL, cable modems or
conventional telephone lines. Bottleneck abuse would occur if DSL and cable modem service
providers, lacking true, facilities-based competition, refuse to accept and deliver VoIP traffic, or
do so only if VoIP service providers pay a higher and discriminatory charge for the origination or
termination 79 of traffic on the DSL or cable modem carrier’s network. The higher charge
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Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act created an express mandate for the FCC and
state public utility commissions to “encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis
of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.” 47 U.S.C. §157(a). The Act
defines advanced telecommunications capability “without regard to any transmission media or
technology, as high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables users
to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using
any technology.” 47 U.S.C. §157(c)(1).
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The FCC acknowledges that different types of carriers pay different rates to originate and
terminate traffic over identical local exchange telephone company facilities. “Existing
intercarrier compensation rules may be categorized as follows: access charge rules, which
govern the payments that interexchange carriers (“IXCs”) and CMRS carriers make to LECs to
originate and terminate long-distance calls. . . . The access charge rules can be further broken
down into interstate access charge rules that are set by this Commission, and intrastate access
charge rules that are set by state public utility commissions. Both the interstate and intrastate
access charge rules establish charges that IXCs must pay to LECs when the LEC originates or
terminates a call for an IXC, or transports a call to, or from, the IXC's point of presence (“POP”).
CMRS carriers also pay access charges to LECs for CMRS-to-LEC traffic that is not considered
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applicable only to unaffiliated VoIP service providers exemplifies a classic price squeeze where
a competitor of the ISP incurs a higher charge for an essential service element than the ISP
charges to affiliates and favored VoIP service providers.
B.

Unjustified Apprehension

Network neutrality advocates fear that the next generation Internet will contain so much
bias and preferential treatment as to jeopardize the fundamental end-to-end connectivity that has
contributed to success. This “curtains for the Internet” perspective overstates the potential harm
from network tiering, even unlawful, anticompetitive practices, for several reasons. ISPs may
want to squeeze out additional revenues and may resort to heavy handed, extortionate tactics, but
surely they would stop when such strategies make the ISP’s network performance inferior vis a
via other available alternatives, if such competition existed. Absent collusion or consciously
parallel conduct among DSL and cable modem carriers, should one ISP overshoot the mark on
network tiering, customers could migrate to the less biased carrier. Put another way if AT&T
deliberately dropped or delayed delivery of Google packets, some customers might migrate to
the faster delivery options paid for by MSN or Yahoo, but other customers might abandon
AT&T in light of it shoddy performance.

local and hence not covered by the reciprocal compensation rules. Other customers carrying
traffic to or from points within an exchange area to points outside the exchange area may also
pay access charges to the LEC. These access charges may have different rate structures- i.e., they
may be flat-rated or traffic-sensitive. In general, where a long-distance call passes through a LEC
circuit switch, a per-minute charge is assessed. In order to keep local telephone rates low, access
charges have traditionally exceeded the forward-looking economic costs of providing access.”
Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, 16 FCC Rcd. 9610, 9611 (2001);
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 4685 (2005).
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While it may provide difficult to detect and prove the “smoking gun” of deliberate packet
dropping and other anticompetitive tactics, after the fact forensic examination may provide the
basis for remedies as was the case when Enron employees created artificial congestion in the
electricity delivery grid to run up prices. 80 Similarly deep pocketed content providers recoiling
from what they consider extortionate rate increases might pursue the option of constructing
alternative broadband access options for consumers such as Google’s support for a city wide WiFi network in San Francisco. 81
But even if network neutrality becomes codified into law or regulation, network
neutrality advocates have to accept that the next generation Internet will contain more bias,
options and service diversification than previously available. Advocates for network neutrality
need to accept that customer and network tiering constitutes a predictable, and not always
lamentable, product of a maturing marketplace. As networks evolve and the technologies used
become more diverse and mature, network operators have available the resources to recalibrate
their pricing structure and to diversify services.
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“[I]n Load Shift, Enron traders submitted false energy schedules and bids to the
California market to create the appearance of congestion on a transmission line. This would
trigger payments attached to easing congestion and let Enron profit from its own lies when it
used its transmission rights to ease the sham congestion.” Mary Flood and Tom Fowler, The Fall
of Enron: Ex-Trader Pleads Guilty To Schemes; Prison, Fines Likely In California Deals, The
Houston Chronicle, Business, p.1 (Feb. 5, 2003).
81

Laurie J. Flynn, Some Worries as San Francisco Goes Wireless, New York Times,
Technology (April 10, 2006); available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/10/technology/10wifi.html?ex=1302321600&en=93da4b89b4
623e07&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
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In light of the marketing tactics used to entice initial subscriptions most Internet users
expect access to a lot of free content, on an all you can eat unmetered basis, 82 at a low fixed
price with delivery speeds progressively increasing without a higher charge. The Internet’s value
proposition has increased over the years as consumers tap into increasingly diverse sites, now
offering material that requires a network capable of delivering a broadband bitstream in real
time. The power users of the Internet, spammers, gamers, peer-to-peer file sharers and full
motion video watchers have become quasi-free riders in light of their ability to pay the same
price as lower volume users, while forcing ISPs at both the end user link and farther upstream, to
upgrade their networks while maintaining the same subscription rate.
III.

The Resolution
Legislation would solve the network neutrality debate by providing principles for which

the FCC would have express legal authority to enforce. In light of the controversy surrounding
this issue, the lack of consensus and well funded policy expressions, Congress may not remedy
the problem in a timely manner. 83 Absent legislation the stakeholders will have to take
affirmative steps on their own toward resolution.
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“What the ISPs don't tell the public is that there are no free-riders among the content
companies. They pay handsomely for their bandwidth. In fact, they are the true bread and butter
for the major telecoms and ISPs. The reason that this "Network Neutrality" controversy exists
today is that ISPs don't want to admit that their whole business model is flawed. They don't want
to admit to their home customers that they need to pay for metered bandwidth just like they pay
for metered water and electricity.” Code Monkey Ramblings Blog, Network Neutrality, posted
May 20, 2006; available at:
http://www.codemonkeyramblings.com/2006/05/network_neutrality.php.
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Both the United States Senate and House of Representatives have considered network
neutrality bills without enacting any into law. Wallace Koehler, Network Neutrality Under
Challenge (May 1, 2006); available at: http://www.infotoday.com/newsbreaks/nb0605011.shtml; Anne Broache, Net neutrality field in Congress gets crowded, cnetnews.com (May 19,
2006); available at:
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One step toward resolution came from AT&T when it made some network neutrality
commitments to secure approval of its merger with BellSouth. 84 AT&T may have offered
concessions with some regret, and the language of its offer has generated concerns that AT&T
has offered less than one might infer. 85 Additionally FCC Chairman Kevin Martin and
Commissioner Tate issued a joint statement where they reject some of the concessions as the
product of coercion which they believe the FCC should never enforce. 86 Nevertheless AT&T has

http://news.com.com/Net+neutrality+field+in+Congress+gets+crowded/2100-1028_36074564.html; Net neutrality showdown, cnetnews.com; available at:
http://news.com.com/Net+neutrality+showdown/2009-1028_3-6055133.html.
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See Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Jr., Sr. Vice President Federal Regulatory AT&T to
Ms . Marlene H. Dortch, FCC Secretary (Dec. 28, 2006); attached to Federal Communications
New Release, FCC Approves Merger Of AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation--Significant
Public Interest Benefits Likely to Result (rel. Dec. 29, 2006); available at:
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-269275A1.pdf[hereinafter cited as
AT&T Concessions Letter].
85

AT&T proposed to embrace the FCC’s four Network Freedoms for 30 months running
from the merger closing date, and to apply network neutrality principles for its broadband
Internet access services running between subscribers and the first Internet exchange point for a
period of two years running from the merger closing date or upon the effective date of federal
legislation. AT&T expressly reserved the option not to apply network neutrality principles for
its Internet Protocol Television (“IPTV”) service and for link beyond the first Internet Exchange
point. The commitment does not provide specificity whether these conditions exempt AT&T
from a network neutrality commitment for any fiber optic broadband link that might also offer
IPTV.
86

“Importantly, however, while the Democrat Commissioners may have extracted
concessions from AT&T, they in no way bind future Commission action. Specifically, a
minority of Commissioners cannot alter Commission precedent or bind future Commission
decisions, policies, actions, or rules. Thus, to the extent that AT&T has, as a business matter,
determined to take certain actions, they are allowed to do so. There are certain conditions,
however, that are not self-effectuating or cannot be accomplished by AT&T alone. To the extent
Commission action is required to effectuate these conditions as a policy going forward, we
specifically do not support those aspects of the conditions and will oppose such policies going
forward.” AT&T BellSouth Merger Approval, Joint Statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin and
Commissioner Deborah Taylor Tate (Dec. 29, 2006); available at:
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-269275A2.doc.
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provided a document that, reluctantly perhaps, acknowledges that network neutrality is a concept
that parties can convert into actual practices and service commitments.
The AT&T network neutrality commitments contain a time limited agreement to comply
with a previous FCC statement of principles that articulate a baseline code of conduct for ISPs.
In a non-binding, non-compulsory Policy Statement the FCC articulated four “principles”:
(1) consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice;
(2) consumers are entitled to run applications and services of their choice, subject to the
needs of law enforcement;
(3) consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the
network; and
(4) consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, application and
service providers, and content providers. 87
Until AT&T’s 30 month commitment to adopt the FCC’s four “Network Freedoms,” the
Commission had issued a document having no enforceability.
AT&T also committed to maintain the same number and types of existing peering
agreements and for two years from the closing date of the merger, or the effective date of any
legislation enacted by Congress subsequent to the merger closing, “to maintain a neutral network
and neutral routing in its wireline broadband Internet access service . . . from the network side of
the customer premise equipment up to and including the Internet Exchange Point closest to the
customer’s premise.” 88 AT&T expressly reserved the right to tier service upstream and
exempted its enterprise managed IP services and IPTV services from any network neutrality
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United States Federal Communications Commission, Public Notice, FCC Adopts Policy
Statement (Aug. 5, 2005); available at: http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC260435A1.doc.
88

AT&T Concessions Letter at 9.
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commitment, two loopholes that will grow in significance as AT&T migrates from copper-based
transitional DSL broadband service to fiber optic networks ostensibly installed primarily to
provide IPTV.
Beyond AT&T’s conditional, time limited and ambiguous commitment, incumbent ISPs
should commit to transparency and full disclosure of network and customer tiering activities.
This means that Tier-1 ISPs, including those networks owned and operated by AT&T, Verizon
Qwest, and Comcast, should publicly disclose their peering and transiting policies, as well as
offers and acceptances of Service Level Agreements that deviate from best efforts routing. A
voluntary agreement to disclose might foreclose regulatory intervention by the FCC, Federal
Trade Commission and other agencies, and it would not prevent better than best efforts service
arrangements. Such arrangements could include variable bandwidth and throughput services to
end users, peers and transiting customers, bandwidth partitioning and service metering.
Additionally any ISP that serves both end users, whether by resale or facilities it owns
and operates, should commit to a “best practices” collection of service commitments including
the following:
an affirmative obligation not to drop packets and create congestion when actual traffic
conditions do not necessitate such action;
no retaliation through targeted degradation in service quality for any network user that
has refused to pay for premium services;
no port blocking and other refusals to deliver traffic onward to another ISP or the
intended recipient except when such action would violate laws or cause harm to the ISP’s
or other ISPs’ networks;
a commitment to make available any better than best efforts to any similarly situated
customer;
an agreement not to override firewalls, filters and other traffic management technologies
or services made available to customers or installed by customers, except when such
action would violate laws or cause harm to the ISP’s or other ISPs’ networks; and
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no intentional failures to comply with existing Service Level Agreements executed with
end users, peers and transiting customers.
IV.

Conclusion
The network neutrality debate highlights a particularly contentious time in ICE policy

making. Stakeholders appear to have little inclination to find a middle ground, and decision
makers appear to have even less. Policy making has become predominated by sponsored
research, politics, campaign contrubutions and rhetoric. In light of an apparent disinterest for the
facts it comes as no surprise that the network neutrality debate highlights opposing perceptions
about the impact from changes in the next generation Internet. Regretably no unbiased fact
finding appears readily available, because politicization at the FCC prevents fair minded
assessment by the Democratic and Republican Commissioners and heretofore the conflict has not
generated a question of law or fact reviewable by a court.
Network neutrality opponents have overstated the case that competition would remedy
any and all instances of illegal network bias. A fully self-regulating Internet marketplace does
not exist, nor can one confidently assert that the Internet marketplace would remedy all attempts
at unreasonable network bias. On the other hand the Internet has not failed to function when
network operators and content providers cut exclusive and preferential deals, or when network
providers offer better than best efforts routing.
For better or worst Internet 3.0 will adopt many of the biased networking characteristics
of current vintage cable television and third generation cellular telephony. Cable television
operators enjoy substantial freedom to cut special content delivery deals, but lawful “must carry”
obligations impose affirmative carriage duties, nothwithstanding cable operators’ First
Amendment speaker rights and non-common carrier status. Commercial mobile radio service
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providers retain the common carrier, telecommunications service provider status, yet they can
use new broadband carriage capabilities to deliver a biased, walled garden access to video and
Internet content.
In light of a mixed likely outcome for Internet 3.0, legislators and regulators should
identify what baseline nondiscrimination requirements an ISP must satisfy, even if it has entered
a safe harbor from Title II telecommunications service regulation. At the risk of stretching Title
I, ancillary regulation, the FCC cannot abdicate Internet 3.0 oversight based on the currently
suspect conclusions that a competitive broadband marketplace exists everywhere, and the
information service classification of Internet access renders the entire Internet off limits to public
interest policy making and regulation.
The FCC may someday receive complaints about Internet tiering and service bias
involving an ISP as opposed to a telecommunications service provider such as Madison River
Communications. Dismissing the complaint for lack of Commission jurisdiction will not make
the problem go away, elevate the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, or successfully insulate
the FCC from having to consider how alleged violations of network neutrality adversely affect
the nation’s advanced telecommunications capabilities.
The FCC should agree to examine allegations of network bias and evaluate the complaint
from a public interest template that considers whether discrimination constitutes an unfair trade
practice, or a reasonable attempt at diversifying and proliferating information services.

